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Abstract:
This paper addresses some of the issues faced by macroeconomic model builders in
analysing the monetary transmission mechanism. These include the sensitivity of the
policy simulation results to changes in the monetary and fiscal policy rule and the
introduction of forward-looking behaviour in the model. To illustrate the importance of
these issues the paper reports the results of variant monetary policy simulations at the
euro-area level using the AWM and NiGEM models.
Keywords: Monetary Transmission Mechanism, Euro Area, Macro Models.
JEL classification: C50, C52, E5ECB • Working Paper No 93 • December 2001  5
Non technical summary
This paper looks at the monetary transmission mechanism at the euro-area level using
macroeconomic models and examines some of the issues raised by such an exercise. The
aim is to consider how important various aspects of model and simulation design are in
determining the results from monetary policy simulations. In this paper we examine the
effects of using monetary and fiscal policy rules and the importance of forward-looking
behaviour. To illustrate the significance of these issues the paper reports the results of a
number of variant simulations using the ECB’s Area Wide Model and the National
Institute Global Economic Model.
The paper takes as its starting point, the last major study of comparative properties of
central bank models, which was carried out by the Bank of International Settlements (BIS)
in 1995. The BIS study examined cross-country differences in the transmission
mechanism of monetary policy involving a hundred basis-point increase in the short-term
policy interest rate for 2 years. In this paper we examine some of the issues faced by
macro model builders in examining the transmission mechanism by undertaking a number
of variant simulations similar to that undertaken in the BIS exercise. A fundamental
difference, however, is that we undertake these simulations at the euro-area level.
Our results highlight the importance of various aspects of model and simulation design in
affecting the results from such monetary policy exercises. We find that the NiGEM and
AWM models yield broadly similar results for the effect of monetary policy on output for
the first 2-3 years when the forward-looking elements of the model are not used. This also
holds true when monetary and fiscal policy rules are introduced into the simulations.
Allowing forward-looking behaviour in the models tends to increase the initial impact of
the monetary policy exercise but also hastens the return to baseline values, albeit with
important differences between the two models in terms of the magnitude and timing of the
effects. In both models, the user cost of capital tends to be the dominant channel of
transmission in terms of its impact on GDP when a common monetary policy is
implemented across all channels.ECB • Working Paper No 93 • December 2001 6
I.  Introduction
This paper looks at the monetary transmission mechanism at the euro-area level using
macroeconomic models and examines some of the issues raised by such an exercise. The
aim is to consider how important various aspects of model and simulation design are in
determining the results from monetary policy simulations – for example, the effects of
using monetary and fiscal policy rules and forward-looking behaviour. To illustrate the
importance of these issues the paper reports the results of a number of variant simulations
using the ECB’s Area Wide Model (AWM) – as described in Fagan et al (2001) - and the
National Institute Global Economic Model (NiGEM).
2
The paper takes as its starting point, the last major study of comparative properties of
central bank models, which was carried out by BIS (1995). The BIS study examined
cross-country differences in the transmission mechanism of monetary policy and
considered the extent to which these could be due to differences in financial structure.
Simulation experiments were undertaken on the models involving a hundred basis-point
increase in the short-term policy interest rate for 2 years.
3 In this paper we examine some
of the issues faced by macro model builders in examining the transmission mechanism by
undertaking a number of variant simulations similar to that undertaken in the BIS (1995)
exercise. A fundamental difference, however, is that we undertake these simulations at the
euro-area level. Although there have been many studies of the monetary transmission
exercise at national levels (see for instance Erhmann (2000)) there has be no
corresponding exercise carried out at the euro aggregate level.
The paper is organised as follows. In section II we consider the nature of the monetary
transmission mechanism in macro models in general and specifically in the AWM and
NiGEM models. In section III we address the issue of how to decompose the results into
individual channels of transmission. In section IV, we consider the issues around the
design of simulation experiments whilst in section V there is a comparison of four variant
simulations beginning with a completely backward-looking simulation with no policy
rules and then gradually introducing policy rules and forward-looking behaviour. The
results of the final simulation are also decomposed into the various channels of
transmission. Section VI concludes.
                                                  
2 The April 2001 release of the NiGEM model was used.
3 The results were summarised by Smets (1995).ECB • Working Paper No 93 • December 2001  7
II.  The Monetary Transmission Mechanism
This section discusses which channels of monetary policy transmission can be identified
in structural macroeconomic models. In general, in most large-scale macroeconomic
models the transmission mechanism of monetary policy takes place primarily through the
interest rate. The central bank chooses the short-term policy interest rate, which has a pass
through to other market yields, asset prices and the exchange rate. Other than these
financial linkages, the main effects typically emerge from output and prices via the impact
on domestic spending (private investment and consumption) and on the external sector
through export and import volumes. These effects are highlighted to differing degrees in
both models and accordingly, we will first try to give an overview of the  general
transmission channels and then discuss those specific to our chosen models
4
When considering typical monetary transmissions (and comparing them across two
separate models) it is useful to have something like a core model in mind. To this end, we
begin by considering an illustrative encompassing maquette (adapted from McAdam,
1999). The idea behind presenting this maquette is that it can serve to illustrate the
standard channels in which monetary policy operates in large scale macroeconomic
models. Indeed, the maquette is intended to be a broad approximation to not only the
models used in this paper but also for other models in the class (such as the IMF’s
“Multimod” model or the Federal Reserve's Multi-Country Model). Of course the
maquette can only provide a starting point as there are specific features of the AWM and
NiGEM which differ from the maquette and have an important bearing on the impact of
monetary policy. We discuss these specific features at the end of this section.
The maquette itself is straightforward to motivate: its long run is supply determined (B8)
but the nominal inertia (B5) and lead expectations (B5, B17, B20) cause dis-equilibrium
and overshooting results in the short run. Roughly half of the model comprises identities.
Besides these, the model has standard features: classical optimality in investment (B3, B10),
Blanchard-Yaari (Blanchard and Fisher, 1989) type consumption (B2), money demand (B7),
a simple uncovered interest parity (B20) and term structure (B17), conventional trade
equations (B19, B21, B22) and integral control policy rules (B15, B16).
                                                  
4 An overview of both models is given in Appendix 2.ECB • Working Paper No 93 • December 2001 8
Box: An Illustrative Encompassing Maquette
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Note: Capital letters symbolise variables in levels and lower-case for logarithms; starred (double starred)
indicates full capacity (foreign) values. The superscript d indicates demand, T indicates target values and e
denotes expectations. Appendix 1 lists variable names. I = term structure length. All parameters are positive.
We omit the ‘other’ country.
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The only direct effect of short-term interest rates is thus on the exchange rate (B20) and
the term structure (B17).
5 Leaving these aside, indirect effects dominate in this particular
model. To illustrate, consider the corresponding change in the nominal long rate given the
term structure (B17) – and in turn the real rate (B18). This change (negatively) affects
capital accumulation through the increased user cost of financing new investment (B10,
B3), which in turn affects output (B1), employment (B4) and the trade balance (B19, B21,
B22) etc. This long rate will also directly affect consumption (B2) since the real lending
rate proxies its opportunity cost.
6 There is also an indirect effect of long rates on
consumption through changes in net wealth (B2, B6). The net-wealth effects typically
stem from such sources as changes in the stock of public debt, the capital stock, the
monetary aggregate and, possibly, changes in equity prices. In the case of equity prices, a
rise in interest rates is conventionally considered to lead to lower equity prices and thus a
de-cumulation of wealth. On the stock of government debt, this is revalued in line with
changes in the long rate: a rise in long rates will lead to a downward revaluation of
holdings of government debt and hence lower net wealth. Finally, there is a role for
interest rates to affect the monetary aggregate (B7), which feeds into government debt
stock with a negative coefficient (B14) and thereby affects net wealth (B6). The short-
term interest rate enters money demand negatively (B7). Notice that a wealth effect can
come through net foreign assets (B19). If the home economy is large (small) enough the
relevant interest rate there will effectively be the home (large country) one (B19).
Finally, there are a number of interest sensitive income effects. Government interest
payments typically depend on long rates (B14) reflecting the term structure of government
debt. Government interest payments feed into personal income (B6) (thereby affecting
consumers’ expenditure) and into the debits of interest, profits and dividends (thereby
affecting net overseas asset accumulation – a component of net wealth, B19) in addition to
affecting the government budget balance (B14, B15).
Comparing the AWM and NiGEM
An important feature of this paper – like that of Bryant et al (1993) and BIS (1995) – is
that we do not specifically seek to harmonise the models. Although many valuable
insights have been made from such exercises, we instead use each model with the baseline
                                                  
5 The complete feedback matrix of monetary policy is through equations. R: 16, 17, 20, RL: 7, 10, 14, 17, 18,
19, RLR: 2, 18. Boldface indicates normalisation.
6 As indeed in conventional macro-theory, the marginal utility of consumption is given by the consumer’s
discount rate, which is bounded by the real steady state interest rate, e.g., Blanchard and Fisher (1989).ECB • Working Paper No 93 • December 2001 10
and equations provided. This allows us to make a practical comparison of how the models
– in standard mode – compare.
The AWM is a single country model of the euro area using aggregated euro area data – a
full description of the model is provided by Fagan et al (2001). Thus, there is no country
dis-aggregation, essentially no (modelled) international linkages and no national monetary
or fiscal rules other than aggregate ones. In other words, the AWM treats EMU members
as one country. NiGEM, by contrast, models each individual country separately and the
euro area results that we report are based on a static aggregation of individual country
results. Nevertheless, it is possible to run the model consistent with a monetary union in
the euro area and thereby ensure common short and long-term nominal interest rates, no
changes in the exchange rates between the residual currencies of the euro area and a
common movement of the euro against third currencies.
Forward-Looking Behaviour
Lead relationships are typically always among the most important ones in a macro-model
since they tend to advance the effects of shocks. In both models there is the possibility to
allow for forward-looking behaviour in both the exchange rate and in long-term interest
rates. In NiGEM, the standard model also allows for forward-looking behaviour in equity
prices, and in the inflation terms used in monetary policy rules and in the wage equations.
The role of these forward-looking terms is discussed in some detail in the remainder of
this section. One general point is that – with the exception of the forward looking inflation
terms in some of the NiGEM wage equations – forward-looking elements have not been
introduced into behavioural equations but into calibrated ones. Therefore there is little
difficulty in adapting these equations for forward-looking behaviour and essentially no
need to re-estimate them.
 It is also worth noting that, expectations may also matter for
other behavioural equations – see for example Sgherri (2000) who examines the
importance of forward-looking behaviour of consumers. However, such forward-looking
elements have not been introduced into the standard versions of these models.
Turning first to the potential for forward-looking behaviour in the exchange rate. As we
know from the maquette, the link from interest rates to the exchange rate is a common
one. It is also typically a very powerful one. The precise effect of that transmission
depends on the exchange rate model. If the nominal exchange rate is fixed then of course
there is no effect. If the exchange rate follows, say, a portfolio balance approach then the
subsequent effect of monetary policy on real activity and potential output will matter. If
the exchange rate follows a PPP closure then the effect of the change on relative pricesECB • Working Paper No 93 • December 2001  11
will be the key and so on. Here, however, and largely in line with many other models, we
only consider a fixed nominal exchange rate or one following forward-looking UIP. The
latter implies that the expected appreciation of the home currency exchange rate is set
equal to the short-term interest differential in favour of the home currency. This is often
modified to include a term in either net foreign assets (NFA) or the current account to




t t q r r er er NFA ) (
*
1 + - + = +  (1)
This equation (being forward looking) needs a terminal condition to ensure a unique
solution – often given by a net foreign asset closure. Solving (1) for the first period:
￿ ￿
= =
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*
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This defines the exchange rate’s initial jump defined by its terminal value (erT) and the
sums of present and future interest rate differentials and net foreign assets. After this
initial jump the exchange rate evolves as,
] NFA ) [(
*
t t t t q r r er + - - = D (3)
Notice, therefore, that modelling exchange rates as modified uncovered interest parity
implies that the exchange rate jumps in response to any change in exogenous instruments
with that change sufficient to clear any effect on net foreign assets brought about by the
shock.
The other area of the financial markets where there is a clear potential for forward-looking
behaviour is in the determination of long rates. As we saw from the maquette, long rates
can be an important conduit of the monetary transmission. Both models have backward-
and forward-looking options. The backward-looking options that we use in both models
are relatively similar in that they both posit a moving-average weight of both short and
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7 The UIP condition can of course be backward looking in which case there is simply a continuous
depreciation.
8 The backward looking long rate equation used in the AWM is not a standard feature of the model but has
been used for illustrative purposes.ECB • Working Paper No 93 • December 2001 12
) 5 . 0 ( 2 . 0 8 . 0 1 1 1 + - + D + = D - - - t t t t t RL R R RL RL
9                                    (5)
However, in both models the forward-looking determination of long-term interest rates is:
￿
=














That is to say, both models directly embody a 10-year bond term structure.
Policy Rules
Both models enable users to implement the same Taylor rule:




2 1 a a a + P + =   (7)
Where R is (as before) the short-term interest rate, p  is current inflation, y is real GDP, a
tilde indicates deviation from (baseline) target (e.g.,  )
T P  and where  3 2,a a  are set at
their standard weights. The NiGEM model also allows for the possibility of a forward-
looking inflation term in the Taylor Rule. In this, the inflation term  p  becomes future
rather than current inflation.
The NiGEM model also offers users a variety of other monetary policy rules including
targets for (1) nominal GDP and inflation, (2) nominal GDP,  (3) inflation and in addition
it is possible to select (4) fixed real interest rates, (5) fixed nominal interest rates or
different combinations of these rules for different countries and/or different time periods
within the same country. 
10 Both models incorporate a fiscal closure rule to maintain a
deficit-output ratio to baseline by changes in the direct tax rate.
Further Specific Features of the Monetary Policy Transmission in the AWM and
NiGEM Models
The maquette describes the transmission channels and structure involved in the AWM
fairly well, although inevitably some exceptions apply. First, short (rather than long) rates
enter consumption and drive the user cost of capital. Second, there is no endogenous
foreign rate and thus the exchange rate (though modelled as UIP) is purely driven by
movements in short-run rates relative to baseline. Also there is no deliberate coding of a
                                                  
9 The risk premium from holding bonds is assumed to be 0.5%.
10 Of course, the AWM could, in principle, also accommodate all these rules but at the current juncture, the
model properties using such rules have not been examined.ECB • Working Paper No 93 • December 2001  13
net foreign asset closure.
11 Third, and more specifically, the income effect is determined
via the impact on government interest payments which are linked to changes in long-term
interest rates. Fourth, the wealth effect is embodied through the capital stock and public
debt. For public debt, as before, interest payments are linked to long term interest rates. In
the case of wealth through capital accumulation, the accumulation of investment defines
the capital stock. Finally, net foreign assets do not directly depend on any domestic
interest rate in the current version of the model.
In relation to the domestic sector in NiGEM it is important to note that, although very
similar, the set-up in each of the national economies within the euro area can be somewhat
different. To an extent, this reflects the deliberate design of the model as the larger
economies are modelled in somewhat more detail than the smaller ones. However, it also
reflects the econometric evidence as – since the behavioural equations are estimated –
interest rate effects have been found to be present in some equations in some countries but
not in others. A good example of this is a direct interest rate effect in consumption, which
is only present in the consumption functions of Italy, the Netherlands and Ireland. The
interest rate used is also different, being the short-rate in Italy and the long-rate in the
Netherlands an Ireland – although in all three cases the coefficient is negative implying
that a rise in interest rates has a direct effect in terms of lowering consumers’ expenditure.
However, indirect effects of interest rates on consumption – via changes in net wealth as
described in the maquette – are present in each of the domestic sectors of these economies.
The effects on net wealth stem from changes in equity prices, the stock of public debt and
in some cases also changes in the monetary aggregate M1. It is worth making a few
remarks on the equity price effects, as they are somewhat richer than outlined in the
maquette. The model allows for backward or forward looking equity prices. In both cases
a rise in interest rates should lead to lower equity prices although in the backward looking
case this is via changes in the long-rate whilst in the forward looking case in is via the
short rate. In the four largest euro area economies (Germany, France, Italy and Spain)
there is a role for interest rates to affect M1, which feeds into the government debt stock
with a negative coefficient and thereby affects net wealth. The short-term interest rate
enters the M1 equation with a negative coefficient in these countries.
Turning now to investment, for most euro area countries in NiGEM, interest rates play a
role through their impact on the capital stock via the user cost of capital variable as
outlined in the maquette. However, in three of the euro area countries – Greece, Ireland
                                                  
11 In the AWM the stabilisation of net foreign asset comes through the real exchange rate, Fagan et al (2001)ECB • Working Paper No 93 • December 2001 14
and Portugal – the set up is a little different. Private sector investment is directly tied to
the long-rate (with a negative co-efficient) and the capital stock is determined based on the
last period’s capital stock plus new investment minus depreciation. Finally, in NiGEM,
the domestic short-term interest rate (and also the short rates of the US, UK, Japan and
Switzerland) feeds into the rate of return on foreign liabilities. This in turn affects the
current account by influencing the debits of interest, profits and dividends.
The final forward-looking element in NiGEM emerges because in the wage equations of
some countries it is possible to introduce forward-looking inflation terms. When these
equations were estimated they typically allowed for the possibility that past, current and
future inflation developments could have an impact on current wages.
12 In estimation a
significant role for expected inflation (with a lead of 1-quarter and instrumented by some
backward-looking terms) was found in some – but not all – countries. When the model is
used in simulation mode it is possible to choose between a term for expected inflation
based on backward-looking variables or alternatively to allow for a truly forward-looking
expected inflation term based on the model generated values for inflation in the next
quarter. This choice has an impact on the dynamics of wages but leaves their long-run
level unaffected.
III.  Decomposing the Channels of Transmission
It is standard practice when reporting monetary transmission exercises to decompose the
total effects into their various (transmission) channels. That is to say, we consider all the
impacts short-term monetary policy changes have, then categorise each in an
economically interpretable manner. Thus, for example, we might consider the sole effect
of interest rate changes on investment/user cost (B3), exchange rates (B20) and
consumption (B2) as sufficiently important to be separately reported. Other such channels
include income and wealth effects as discussed above. Such a channel decomposition was
also a feature of the BIS exercise. In this section we first discuss some of the theory
behind the decomposition into channels before addressing the practical issues surrounding
their implementation in the two models.
13
In principle, the effect of each of these channels should sum to the total effect. To
illustrate, consider the structural macro-model:
                                                  
12 In the long-run real wages are determined by labour productivity and the unemployment rate.
13 Mauskopf and Siviero (1995) and Altissimo et al (2001) also examine the issue of decomposing the
channels of transmission.ECB • Working Paper No 93 • December 2001  15
t t t t t V R X Y Y + + + = - 3 2 1 1 p p p  (8)
Where Y represents endogenous elements, X exogenous variables, R the exogenous
monetary instrument and V a vector of residuals. Let us assume here for simplicity and
without loss of generality – in contrast to the maquette – that R represents the only
available monetary instrument. If we backward substitute this model to an arbitrary start,
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From this, we can derive key monetary multipliers. The Impact Multiplier of the change in
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t . Matrix  3 p  thus defines the pure feedback
whereas  3 1p p
j defines the total effect. To return to our maquette example: if the interest
rate only affects money demand (B7), this means that  3 p  has a single non-zero element
( 5 b - ).
14 Since money demand affects Wealth (B6) which in turn affects Consumption
(B2), Output (B1), Import demand (B21) and so on, these subsequent effects are embodied
in 
j
1 p . Undoubtedly this will have some zeros  (i.e., the monetary instrument will not
affect every endogenous variable). Specifically, closing off all the channels relegates  3 p
to be a null matrix. Systematic opening of one channel decreases its sparsity by one
element or one block of elements. In a linear model, the sum of these effects is commonly
understood to equal the global effect. In all of this, the linkages through 
j
1 p  need not be
controlled.
Although, on one level, straightforward to understand, channel decompositions can
become complicated. First, because some channels of interest that are present in some
models may be absent in others: this makes model comparisons (such as ours) difficult
and imperfect. Second, since most macro-models are non-linear, the individual effects of
                                                  
14 Effectively this would mean dropping B17 from the maquette and taking RL as our monetary policy
instrument.ECB • Working Paper No 93 • December 2001 16
the channels need not necessarily sum to the global one. Third, in some exercises, the
summation of the channels is not logically defined. This is in fact a feature of some of our
own results when using endogenous policy rules and lead expectations. In such
circumstances, it may make more sense to view the channel decompositions and
summations are as very broad comparisons and local approximations.
To illustrate, let us say we perform a global simulation where all channels operate (i.e.  3 p









t  as well as the trajectory, { }
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t t R 1 = . If we
allow monetary policy to operate after the initial two-year shock then  { }
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t t R 1 =  will
necessarily be channel-dependent (as indeed our later simulations show). Let us say we
have  I decompositions or channels. The first one is identified by,
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. In other words, if the monetary response is different in each channel, the
complete aggregation is not defined. In fact, the same thing could be said for any fiscal
policy response. Thus, we can consider three decompositions worth performing. First,
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reference, we show results for the first two of these.
Identifying the Channels in Practice
In the following we follow the channels identified in the BIS (1995) exercise:
•  An income/cash flow channel, which measures the effect of interest rates on net
interest payments.
•  A wealth channel to capture the impact of interest rates on wealth.
•  A direct interest channel on consumption.
•  A cost of capital channel to capture the effect of interest rates on investment.
•  An exchange rate channel to capture the effects of changes in the exchange rate due to
changes in interest rates.
The approach taken was to simulate the model with all channels switched off except the
one of interest. To identify the channels a somewhat eclectic approach was taken. EitherECB • Working Paper No 93 • December 2001  17
we could exogenise whole equations –such as the Investment equation (B3) to capture the
user-cost effect – or we could fix the interest rate effects entering individual equations to
base value. In the AWM, the latter approach was adopted which involved substantial re-
coding of the model. In NiGEM, the channels were removed by exogenising the equations
where the short-or long-term interest rate first appear. This provided a relatively tractable
way of identifying the channels without the need to significantly alter the model by
removing the interest rate effects in particular equations. In some cases the results would
have been identical to the approach undertaken in the AWM – for example as a separate
user cost of capital variable was available which only affected investment via the capital
stock it was possible to exogenise the user cost variable and thereby effectively remove
the interest rate effect on investment without switching off the investment equation.
However, in other cases – such as for Greece, Ireland and Portugal where there were
direct interest rate effects in investment – it was necessary to exogenise investment to
remove the effect of changes in interest rates.
Finally, in relation to the channels, one point that should be borne in mind is that the
models used cannot account for a credit channel as they have neither credit equations nor
lending interest rates.
IV.  Design of Monetary Policy Transmission Simulation Experiments.
This section discusses how key aspects of both model construction and the design of
simulation experiments have an important bearing on the estimated size of monetary
policy effects in structural macroeconomic models. We begin by considering whether
monetary and fiscal policies can really be treated as exogenous in model simulations. It
has been common for model users to undertake ‘what-if’ exercises, which examine the
consequences of changes in exogenous policy settings. However, it is now customary for
modellers to include ‘closure-rules’ in their models, which explain the behaviour of
monetary and fiscal policy.
Reflecting this, the first issue we address is whether monetary policy can be treated as
exogenous or whether it is more appropriate to treat policy as endogenous via a policy
rule. In the former case, monetary policy experiments can involve a shock to the policy
interest rate. In the latter case, it is common to undertake monetary policy experiments via
a shock to the policy rule – e.g. a change in the target for the inflation rate or the money
stock. In principle, the shock to the policy rule can be calibrated in such a way as to yieldECB • Working Paper No 93 • December 2001 18
the same change in the policy interest rate that could be imposed if the interest rate were
treated as exogenous. For example, in the case of the BIS (1995) exercise of a 100 basis
point increase in the policy interest rates in a model with a policy rule, it would be
possible to identify a change in the policy rule that would induce a change in the policy
interest rate of the same magnitude. However, it is important to bear in mind that when
comparing results across models, a common shock to a policy rule can produce very
different reactions of policy interest rates, a point that is illustrated in the following
examples.
Mitchell et al (1998) compared three global models – MULTIMOD, MSG2 and NiGEM –
undertaking a number of comparative simulation exercises involving a number of variant
simulations with changes in fiscal and monetary policy. The latter was achieved via a
permanent 5% increase in the money target variable in the models, which induced a
reduction in the policy short-term interest rate. However, the reaction was rather different
across models. This can be seen in the case of Germany where the same change in the
money target lead to a fall in German short-term interest rates of just over 1% in
MULTIMOD and NiGEM but over 2% in MSG2 in the first year. In all cases, the interest
rates gradually returned to baseline thereafter, although the speed of the return noticeably
varied across the models.
Similarly, Church et al (2000) examined monetary policy in models of the UK economy
via a 0.5 percentage point reduction in the inflation target. In three of the five models
examined, the change in inflation target initially induces a rise in the short-term interest
rate ranging from 0.16 to 1.28 percentage points. However, in the other two models there
is an immediate fall in the nominal interest rate of between 0.30 and 0.37 percentage
points. The explanation for the difference is that the achievement of the new lower
inflation target is achieved much more quickly in the latter models (inflation falls by
around 0.4% in the first year) and hence interest rates need to be lower in order to return
the real interest rate to its baseline value. 
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An interesting related question is whether to keep monetary policy endogenous or
exogenous after the completion of the initial monetary policy shock. If monetary policy is
kept exogenous then there may be prolonged periods of dis-equilibria in many
macroeconomic models. This point can easily be seen with reference to the example of a
two-year hike in policy interest rates followed by a return to base. For example, in the
initial period, output falls below base and a negative output gap emerges (measured
                                                  
15 Notably, in forward-looking models, with full credibility and no price-level stickiness, interest rates would
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relative to base). Even when interest rates return to baseline at year three, the negative
output gap is likely to mean that inflation is also below base and hence real interest rates
remain above base. This is likely to induce a further fall in output and in the absence of
any prompt equilibrating mechanism in the model a downward spiral of falling output and
inflation and rising real interest rates may continue for some time.
For this reason, there may be a case for allowing monetary policy to be endogenous
following completion of the initial (fixed) monetary policy experiment. The precise
response of monetary policy would depend on the type of rule in place. In the previous
example, with a Taylor Rule, the negative output gap and lower inflation would be
expected to result in interest rates falling below base for a period to allow the negative
output gap to be closed and inflation to return to base. The drawback of such an approach
is that it renders the results sensitive to the policy rule used and therefore limits the
comparability of results across models if each model incorporates a different monetary
policy response.
The use of fiscal policy rules in structural macroeconomic models raises some similar
issues. It has long been recognised – e.g., Christ (1968) – that the government budget
constraint is important. If a government deficit emerges in a simulation, it is necessary to
have some financing assumption. Therefore, many models now incorporate fiscal closure
rules, which aim to maintain some level of fiscal solvency through adjusting fiscal
variables (often the direct tax rate but sometimes government expenditure) to achieve a
target specified either in terms of the deficit or debt stock. Both models incorporate such a
rule to maintain a deficit ratio to baseline by changes in the direct tax rate. In some
situations, particularly in models with many forward-looking elements, such rules can
help stabilise the model. In the above example, a decline in output stemming from the
monetary policy tightening would be likely to result in a worsening of the fiscal position
due to lower tax receipts and higher transfers. In such circumstances, a fiscal policy rule
would seek to restore the original fiscal position through a tightening of policy (either on
the revenue or expenditure side) and would therefore exacerbate the original fall in
output.
16 The main argument against incorporating fiscal reaction functions is that they
would undermine the comparability of the results across models.
An important feature of model design that will significantly affect the results of
simulations is the treatment of expectations of variables such as long-term interest rates,
the exchange rate and inflation. A traditional way of dealing with expectations in macro
                                                  
16 The extent to which the operation of the fiscal rule would reinforce the downturn would depend on the
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models was to assume that they are determined as a function of current and lagged values
of some observed variables – often in the form of adaptive expectations. However,
reflecting the increased popularity of the notion of rational expectations in recent decades
there has been a move to including expectations that are genuinely forward-looking in the
sense that they are consistent with the future outcomes generated by the model. For this
reason they are often called ‘model-consistent’ expectations.
17 As already discussed the
AWM and NiGEM models allow, albeit to varying degrees, for forward-looking
behaviour. In the next section we explore the implications of changing the extent of
forward-looking behaviour in the models.
V.  Simulation Experiments Using the AWM and the NiGEM Models
To illustrate the importance of the issues raised in the previous section, we now turn to a
comparison of the results of a number of simulation exercises using the AWM and
NiGEM.
The Comparative Simulation Experiments
(1) As a starting point we followed BIS (1995) and undertook a monetary policy
experiment involving an increase of the short-term policy interest rates by 1 percentage
point for two years (in our case 2001Q1-2002Q4 inclusive). Thereafter (i.e. from 2003Q1)
a return to baseline values was assumed and no monetary policy rules were implemented.
No fiscal rules were in operation either and the models were run in an entirely backward-
looking mode with a fixed nominal exchange rate.
(2) The next simulation experiment was identical to simulation 1, except for the fact that a
monetary policy rule was implemented at the end of the two-year initial shock (i.e. from
2003Q1 onwards). The form of the monetary reaction is the Taylor rule specified in
equation (7) with 
d P and Y
d set at their baseline values.
(3) The next simulation was identical to simulation 2 but a fiscal policy rule was allowed
to operate from the start of the simulation. As was discussed in the previous section the
fiscal rule in both models adjusts the direct tax rate to achieve a target for the government
budget balance as a proportion of GDP.
                                                  
17 There is, of course, a large literature on whether expectation formation can really be described as  ‘rational’.
Roberts (1998) examines the evidence on inflation expectations and examines the rationality of US surveys of
inflation expectations. He concludes that the expectations reported by these surveys represent an intermediate
degree of rationality. As the issue of the appropriate degree of rationality in expectations formation is an open
one we illustrate the importance of this question in the next section when we will undertake the monetary
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(4) The final simulation was identical to 3 but it allowed all the forward-looking elements
of the models to operate.
18 For the NiGEM model, this meant that there was forward
behaviour in the determination of the exchange rate, long rates, equity prices, wage
formation and the inflation rate entering into the Taylor rule. In the AWM the forward-
looking elements are the exchange rate and the long-term rate.
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For information, the GDP and inflation responses from one additional simulation are
reported in Appendix 3 of this paper. These correspond to a simulation with the same
movement in short-term interest rates, no monetary or fiscal policy rules and a pre-
determined exogenous path for the exchange rate and the long rate. This experiment
reflects the monetary policy experiment using national central banks models and the
AWM reported in Van Els et al (2001).
The Results
The results of the simulation experiments are shown in Tables 1-4. In the first simulation,
the rise in short-rates induces a rise in long-rates in both models but the pattern is rather
different – reflecting the differences in the backward looking equations for the long rate
(see equations 4-6). In NiGEM, the long rate increases by nearly as much as the short rate
in the first two years and then immediately returns to close to the baseline thereafter. In
the AWM, the immediate rise in the long rate is much smaller than the rise in the short
rate.
In terms of the impact on activity, both the maximum and the average loss of output over
the first three years are quite similar, but there are differences in the timing of the output
loss. With the NiGEM simulation, output falls by 0.09% in the first year, dropping by
0.36% and 0.44% in the second and third years respectively. In the AWM simulation, the
initial impact is somewhat larger with a fall in output of 0.23% in year 1 reaching to
0.46% in year 2 before moderating to 0.39% in the third year. Thereafter, in both models,
there is a tendency for output to return to the baseline, and then to remain above the
baseline for sometime. However, whilst both models show such a tendency, the reversion
                                                  
18 For reference, NiGEM was simulated using a (Gauss-Seidel) Fair-Taylor  (e.g., Fisher, 1992) routine and
the AWM with the Stack-Time algorithm (Juillard et al, 1998, McAdam and Hughes-Hallett, 1999).
19 We do not report any simulations with endogenous monetary policy for the whole period – i.e. from 2001Q1
onwards. However, a number of additional simulations were undertaken on the NiGEM in which the policy
rule was shocked in order to generate a rise in interest rates of around 1 percentage point for two years. For
example, it was found that in a simulation identical to number (4) above except that monetary policy was
determined by an inflation target rule a fall in the inflation target for the first 9 quarters of 1.35 percentage
points would deliver a rise in short term interest rates of around 1 percentage point in the first two years. (The
inflation target needed to be altered for 9 periods – i.e. one in excess of the desired monetary policy reaction –
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to base is more protracted in the AWM due to the fact that the AWM involves relatively
weaker feedbacks and error corrections leading to a slower speed of adjustment.
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Table 1: Simulation 1:
GDP PCE U S-Rate L-Rate Nom XR Real XR TBR GBR
NiGEM
1 -0.09 0.00 0.03 1.00 0.85 0.00 0.00 0.03 -0.21
2 -0.36 -0.03 0.15 1.00 0.94 0.00 0.00 0.11 -0.45
3 -0.44 -0.12 0.19 0.00 0.12 0.00 -0.02 0.11 -0.44
5 0.08 -0.34 -0.07 0.00 0.02 0.00 -0.17 -0.01 -0.19
10 0.10 0.03 -0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.03 0.07
AWM
1 -0.23 -0.03 0.07 1.00 0.24 0.00 -0.04 0.17 -0.10
2 -0.46 -0.11 0.25 1.00 0.36 0.00 -0.15 0.27 -0.29
3 -0.39 -0.21 0.35 0.00 0.17 0.00 -0.24 0.13 -0.39
5 -0.17 -0.40 0.19 0.00 0.02 0.00 -0.45 0.01 -0.40
10 0.43 -0.06 -0.63 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.05 -0.16 -0.17
Notes: GDP is real GDP, PCE is the consumer’s expenditure deflator, U is the standardised unemployment
rate, S-Rate is the 3-month interest rate, L-Rate is the 10-year interest rate, Nom XR is the nominal exchange
rate, Real XR is the real exchange rate, TBR is the Real Trade Balance and GBR is the government budget
balance to GDP ratio. GDP, PCE, Nom XR and Real XR are all expressed as a percentage difference from
baseline. The remaining variables are expressed as an absolute difference from baseline. A fall in the nominal
or real exchange rate is a depreciation.
The government budget balance worsens in both cases as lower output leads to lower tax
receipts and higher government transfers due to higher unemployment. However, the
deterioration of the fiscal position in the first two years is more pronounced in NiGEM
despite a more modest output loss over this period compared with the AWM. This reflects
a greater sensitivity of the fiscal variables to changes in economic activity in NiGEM than
in the AWM. It is also the case that changes in economic activity exert a larger impact on
unemployment in the AWM, albeit with a somewhat longer lag than in NiGEM. After
three years, the unemployment rate is 0.35 of a percentage point higher in the AWM
compared with a rise of 0.19 of a percentage point in the NiGEM simulation. This is
despite the fact that in year 3 output is further below its baseline in the NiGEM simulation
than in the AWM one. However, the longer lag in the impact on unemployment is
indicated by the fact that the peak in the rise in unemployment occurs after the trough in
the fall in output in the AWM, in contrast with the NiGEM results when both effects occur
in the same year.
                                                  
20 For instance, see McAdam (2001) for a frequency-domain analysis of euro-area data.  There, it is suggested
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The response of prices reflects the developments in output, albeit with a marked lag due to
conventional sticky price mechanisms in models. In NiGEM, prices do not fall
significantly in the first couple of years, but by year 3 they are 0.12% below base and in
year 5 they are 0.34% below and thereafter they return to base. In the AWM the fall in
prices is more marked in the first two years (reflecting the larger initial output loss) and
continues to gather pace during the reporting period for the simulation and in year 5 prices
are 0.40% below base. In both models, by year 10, prices have moved close to their
baseline levels. However, it is noteworthy that in the AWM simulation output is above its
baseline level whilst the unemployment rate is still markedly below its baseline level. This
indicates that there is still some further adjustment to take place before all variables have
sustainably returned to their baseline levels. Therefore after year 10 there are still some
oscillations in the AWM results, albeit of a gradually diminishing magnitude.
21 This effect
is not present to a noticeable extent in the NiGEM model.
The fact that the simulations show a tendency to return to base partly reflects the fact that
there is a fixed nominal exchange rate. The lower domestic prices mean that there is
depreciation in the real exchange rate, which ultimately boosts output through trade. This
is reflected in the trade balance, which improves as lower domestic activity reduces the
demand for imports and lower domestic prices improve both import and export
competitiveness.
22 This boost to net trade ultimately restores output and prices to their
baseline levels.
In the second simulation, the first two years are identical but in the third year, the Taylor
Rule begins to operate. Because output and prices are both below base there is a decline in
the short-term interest rate in the third year in both models. In NiGEM the Taylor Rule
leads to a decline in short term interest rates of 38 basis points whilst in the AWM the
                                                  
21 The precise nature of the apparent oscillatory behaviour in some of the AWM results (and to a lesser extent
NiGEM) is beyond the scope and purpose of the present paper since we use both models in their given form.
Technically, oscillatory behaviour can be traced and analysed using the linearised eigenvalues of the model
equations. For instance, given a simple linear difference equation, Yt - aYt-1 - bYt-2 = V, we have the general
solution, Yt = A1l1
t + A2l2
t + Y
SS. As is well known (e.g. Chiang, 1974) roots (i.e., the li’s) less than one
without (with) imaginary components generate stable non-oscillatory (stable oscillations) dynamics towards
the steady state, and one stable and unstable root without (with) imaginary components yields unstable non-
oscillatory (unstable oscillatory) dynamics. In more intuitive economic terms, the fact that in the AWM,
employment is obtained by inverting the Cobb-Douglas production essentially gives rise to a larger than one
employment-to-GDP elasticity and thus potentially to some “over reaction” of employment to changes in GDP
in the short run, only compensated in the long run by changes in the capital stock. Similarly, the lack of a
smoothing parameter (in both models) in the Taylor rule may engender a relatively high degree of interest-rate
volatility. To illustrate, most empirical estimates of Taylor rules give estimates of such smoothing parameters
of around 0.6-0.8.
22 The current account balance (which is not shown in the table) in NiGEM actually worsens in the initial
period as the rise in interest rates increases the magnitude of debits of interest profits and dividends.ECB • Working Paper No 93 • December 2001 24
decline is more modest. As the parameters of the Taylor rules are identical the difference
in outcomes is due to the fact that when the rule begins to operate the output loss and fall
in inflation are both greater in NiGEM than in the AWM. This is not immediately
apparent from the table as in year 3 the change in prices is the same in both sets of results.
However, to some extent this reflects the fact that the annual average figures mask intra-
year changes and the larger fall in interest rates induced by the Taylor Rule in NiGEM has
already begun to have an effect in boosting output and prices. When the rule is
implemented in the first quarter of year 3 both output and inflation are further below base
in the NiGEM simulation than they are in the AWM.
Inevitably the lower interest rates from year 3 onwards reduce the magnitude of the
subsequent output losses – although the initial impact is not that large. In year 3 the output
loss is reduced by about 0.05% in both the NiGEM and AWM simulations when
compared with the first simulation. Some interesting contrasts then emerge between the
results from the two models. In NiGEM short term interest rates are close to baseline by
year 5, but this return to baseline takes longer in the AWM, reflecting the fact that output
and prices are below base for longer. In both models the use of the Taylor Rule speeds the
return of GDP towards the baseline. As both also generate a period of above baseline
GDP, the Taylor Rule then works to reduce towards the baseline by raising short-term
interest rates. This pattern can be seen quite clearly in Figures 1a and 2a.ECB • Working Paper No 93 • December 2001  25
Table 2: Simulation 2:
GDP PCE U S-Rate L-Rate Nom XR Real XR TBR GBR
NiGEM
1 -0.09 0.00 0.03 1.00 0.85 0.00 0.00 0.03 -0.21
2 -0.36 -0.03 0.15 1.00 0.94 0.00 0.00 0.11 -0.45
3 -0.40 -0.12 0.18 -0.38 -0.20 0.00 -0.02 0.10 -0.36
5 0.20 -0.30 -0.12 0.08 0.05 0.00 -0.14 -0.03 -0.08
10 0.03 -0.01 -0.01 0.04 0.05 0.00 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03
AWM
1 -0.23 -0.03 0.07 1.00 0.24 0.00 -0.04 0.17 -0.10
2 -0.46 -0.11 0.25 1.00 0.36 0.00 -0.15 0.27 -0.29
3 -0.33 -0.20 0.33 -0.23 0.11 0.00 -0.23 0.09 -0.37
5 -0.09 -0.36 0.12 -0.10 -0.03 0.00 -0.39 -0.03 -0.32
10 0.13 -0.06 -0.40 0.53 0.20 0.00 0.02 -0.03 -0.17
In the third simulation, with the fiscal policy rule the effects on output are actually larger
in the first few years as the fiscal rule seeks to close the widening government deficit
through raising direct taxation. The initial impact of the fiscal rule on output is not that
large, but it does increase in importance. The effect of the fiscal rule is initially slightly
larger in NiGEM. This is because, as already discussed, the monetary policy shock has a
larger initial impact on the public finances in NiGEM than in the AWM - reflecting a
greater cyclical sensitivity of the fiscal variables in NiGEM. In the third year output is
0.59% below base in NiGEM whilst in the AWM it is 0.42% below base. Thereafter the
standard pattern of output returning to base more quickly in NiGEM than in the AWM
reasserts itself.
One notable feature of this simulation is that the fall in the price level is somewhat more
pronounced – notably in the AWM where prices are 1.25% below base in year 10 – in this
simulation. Reflecting the lower output induced by the fiscal contraction, the response of
the Taylor Rule is to lower interest rates by a larger amount – 52 basis points in NiGEM
and 31 basis points in the AWM – in the third year.ECB • Working Paper No 93 • December 2001 26
Table 3: Simulation 3
GDP PCE U S-Rate L-Rate Nom XR Real XR TBR GBR
NiGEM
1 -0.10 0.00 0.04 1.00 0.85 0.00 0.00 0.04 -0.17
2 -0.44 -0.03 0.18 1.00 0.94 0.00 0.00 0.14 -0.27
3 -0.59 -0.15 0.26 -0.52 -0.32 0.00 -0.02 0.15 -0.06
5 0.02 -0.46 -0.05 -0.13 -0.14 0.00 -0.19 0.02 0.14
10 0.01 -0.23 0.00 0.07 0.07 0.00 -0.18 0.05 0.00
AWM
1 -0.23 -0.03 0.07 1.00 0.24 0.00 -0.04 0.17 -0.10
2 -0.48 -0.11 0.26 1.00 0.36 0.00 -0.15 0.28 -0.27
3 -0.42 -0.22 0.37 -0.31 0.09 0.00 -0.25 0.16 -0.28
5 -0.37 -0.49 0.33 -0.38 -0.12 0.00 -0.56 0.11 -0.05
10 -0.03 -1.25 -0.06 0.06 -0.01 0.00 -1.28 0.11 0.14
In the fourth simulation with forward-looking behaviour, the results are quite different
from the preceding three backward looking simulations. A marked contrast is in the
reaction of long term interest rates. This is not due to a different equation for long-term
interest rates as the forward-looking condition is the same in both models. The reaction of
long-rates in NiGEM is much more subdued – a rise of 10 basis points in year 1 and a
return to baseline in year 2 – as the forward-looking condition takes into account that the
initial hike in short rates will only last for 2-years but also that the Taylor Rule will
subsequently ensure that interest rates will fall below baseline for a period after the initial
rise. However in the AWM model the long rate actually falls significantly in the first year
– by 31 basis points rising to 40 basis points in year 2 – as the forward-looking long rate
reacts to the larger and protracted falls in short term interest rates from year 3 onwards.
It is worth noting, as discussed earlier, that the impact of long rates is rather different in
the two models. In NiGEM long rates affect investment (via the user cost of capital),
consumption in some countries and also affect some financial variables. A rise in long-
rates will tend to lower economic activity through lower investment and to some extent
also lower consumers’ expenditure. In the AWM the only impact of the long-rate is on
financial variables and in particular government interest payments to the personal sector.
Nevertheless, the impact of this change in government interest payments generates strong
income effects in the AWM which mean that a rise in long-term interest rates can haveECB • Working Paper No 93 • December 2001  27
surprisingly strong  positive short-term effects on personal income and thereby also
economic activity.
Table 4: Simulation 4
GDP PCE U S-Rate L-Rate Nom XR Real XR TBR GBR
NiGEM
1 -0.24 -0.05 0.08 1.00 0.10 1.11 1.05 0.05 -0.16
2 -0.31 -0.08 0.15 1.00 -0.01 0.26 0.13 0.04 -0.16
3 -0.19 -0.15 0.08 -0.24 -0.06 -0.16 -0.33 0.06 0.07
5 -0.09 -0.31 0.00 -0.12 -0.02 0.20 -0.15 0.03 0.05
10 -0.02 -0.37 0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.31 -0.01 0.01 0.01
AWM
1 -0.41 -0.10 0.12 1.00 -0.31 0.88 0.80 0.24 -0.05
2 -0.86 -0.24 0.47 1.00 -0.40 -0.05 -0.35 0.47 -0.11
3 -0.83 -0.39 0.72 -0.60 -0.40 -0.42 -0.90 0.36 0.00
5 -0.61 -1.02 0.70 -0.86 -0.16 0.88 -0.24 0.11 0.17
10 0.04 -2.95 0.01 -0.09 0.27 3.72 0.91 -0.20 -0.03
Another important difference is the reaction of the exchange rate, which is no longer
fixed. The rise in short-term interest rates now leads to a step appreciation in the exchange
rate of 1.11% in the first year in NiGEM and 0.88% in the AWM. However, thereafter the
exchange rate paths diverge with the NiGEM model generating a nominal exchange rate
which remains relatively close to the baseline (+/- 0.3%) whilst the AWM initially
generates some oscillations and leads to the nominal exchange rate being 3.7%
appreciated compared with the base by year 10.
In terms of its effect on output in the first year, the exchange rate appreciation more than
offsets the effect of lower long rates and output falls by 0.24% in NiGEM. Thereafter, the
effects on output are smaller and the return to something closer to baseline is markedly
faster and smoother in this simulation. This can be seen clearly in Figure 1a, which
compares the GDP response in the four simulations. In the forward looking simulation
there is a much smoother return towards the baseline without the overshooting seen in the
other three simulations.ECB • Working Paper No 93 • December 2001 28















































This pattern is also reflected in the development of prices as indicated in Figure 1b, which
plots the deviation of inflation from baseline. Simulation 4 is notably different from the
other three in that the inflation rate gradually asymptotes onto the baseline and there is no
need for a period of above baseline inflation to restore the price level to its original level.
In simulation 4 the price level is permanently higher, the nominal exchange rate is
permanently appreciated but the real exchange rate is unchanged.
                                                  
23 The scales in Figures 1a and 2a are identical as are the scales in Figures 1b and 2b, to enable fair
comparison to be made between the AWM and NiGEM results.ECB • Working Paper No 93 • December 2001  29









































In the AWM, the initial output effect is also much larger due to the exchange rate
appreciation and the fall in the long rate. Since the long-rate only feeds into public debt-
related income-bearing assets the immediate effect is to reduce households’ public debt-
related income through lower interest repayments. Since – in the current version of the
model – all such income is held domestically, this is clearly a significant (negative)
channel. Output falls by 0.41% in the first year and by 0.86% in the second before
gradually moving towards the baseline thereafter. The results from the simulations using
the AWM are shown in Figure 2a. Although superficially, the AWM results look very
different from the NiGEM results there is a similar broad pattern. Output effects in the
forward-looking simulation are initially more pronounced than in simulation 3, but the
forward-looking simulation settles down at the baseline level more quickly.
24
                                                  
24 In the case of the AWM, the final reversion to baseline can not be seen clearly in Figure 2a as it occurs after
10 years. A chart comparing the reversion to baseline over a long time horizon is available from the authors
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Figure 2 gives details of the response of inflation in the four AWM simulations.
Reflecting the deeper fall in output in simulation 4, inflation falls further below baseline in
the simulation 4, although by 10 years it is clearly moving back towards the baseline.
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The considerably faster reaction of the NiGEM model in the forward-looking scenario
reflects the far larger number of forward-looking elements within the NiGEM model. As
already discussed, in addition to forward looking long rates and the exchange rate,
NiGEM incorporates forward-looking behaviour in wage formation equity prices and the
Taylor Rule takes into account expected prices. It is well known (e.g., Fisher, 1992)) that
more forward-looking models tend to exhibit faster reactions compared to models with
fewer forward-looking elements. In the absence of substantially more forward-looking
elements in the AWM – the relatively larger initial demand effects in simulation 4 take
some time to die out. Investigating the degree to which more forward-looking elements
can be put in the AWM is the subject of ongoing research.
Since NiGEM has individual country blocks it is possible to decompose the euro area
results by country. Although our main focus is on the euro area, the GDP responses from
the fourth simulation are shown in Table 5 for information. In terms of the initial impact,
it is noteworthy that the countries most exposed to trade with countries outside the EU
25
(Ireland, Finland, Belgium, Netherlands, Austria and Italy) all report an above average fall
in GDP in the first year when there is a marked appreciation in the euro exchange rate. By
the second year, when most of the initial appreciation has been reversed then the domestic
channels are likely to assume greater importance. In this regard, in year 2 the greatest
output loss is in Spain (-0.41%) which is also the country with the greatest interest
sensitivity of the capital stock and hence investment. The output fall in Italy is also above
the euro area average, reflecting the impact of short-term interest rates on consumers’
expenditure.
After the initial monetary policy shock, the return to baseline is particularly slow in
Finland and to a somewhat lesser extent also in Italy. These patterns of reaction to the
monetary policy shock principally reflect different adjustment speeds of the estimated
equations from the individual national blocks in NiGEM.
To put these NiGEM results in context, Figure 3 compares them with the country level
results for the seven euro area countries reported in the 1995 BIS exercise. As the BIS
exercise was conducted under different assumptions (which varied between countries)
regarding monetary policy, the exchange rate and long rate such comparisons should be
interpreted with care. The figure compares the average of the (annual) output losses in
                                                  
25 In terms of extra-EU exports as a proportion of GDP as reported in European Economy 2000.ECB • Working Paper No 93 • December 2001 32
each of the first two years (before the Taylor Rule begins to affect monetary policy in year
3).
Table 5: GDP Response in Simulation 4 Decomposed by euro area Country
1 2 3 5 10
Belgium -0.27 -0.18 -0.14 -0.15 -0.02
Finland -0.25 -0.36 -0.27 -0.21 -0.18
France -0.17 -0.29 -0.20 -0.13 -0.01
Germany -0.31 -0.34 -0.12 -0.08 -0.02
Greece -0.18 -0.26 -0.10 -0.01 -0.04
Ireland -0.28 -0.27 -0.08 -0.04 -0.04
Italy -0.17 -0.34 -0.34 -0.15 0.00
Netherlands -0.27 -0.25 -0.12 -0.14 -0.09
Austria -0.45 -0.23 -0.08 -0.10 0.00
Portugal -0.17 -0.06 0.02 -0.04 -0.04
Spain -0.26 -0.41 -0.25 0.13 0.00
Euro area -0.24 -0.31 -0.19 -0.09 -0.02
Not surprisingly the NiGEM results show a much greater consistency across countries,
partly reflecting the fact that the exercise was genuinely harmonised across countries
within NiGEM. Doubtless it will also reflect the greater degree of similarity in the
individual country blocks in NiGEM than the 7 distinct models developed by the national
central banks. Nevertheless, the impact on GDP for the two largest euro area countries –
Germany and France – is very similar. For Italy the BIS reported a stronger loss in output
whilst for the remaining 4 countries NiGEM reports stronger output effects. In some cases
the weaker effects reported in the BIS may be due to the lack of inclusion of international
spillovers which will be automatically taken into account in NiGEM. This is likely to be
particularly important for the smaller more open economies – such as Austria, Belgium
and the Netherlands – who may be significantly affected by the output losses in other
European countries. Exports to other EU countries make up over 50% of GDP in Belgium,
over 30% in the Netherlands and over 20% in Austria compared with around 15% in
Germany and France and 11% in Italy.
26
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Figure 3: Comparison of the Average Output Loss in the First Two Years using
NiGEM and the Results of the 1995 BIS Exercise
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The above simulations show only the overall effect of a change in monetary policy on the
endogenous variables. But, as discussed, it is standard practice when reporting such results
to decompose them into their various (transmission) channels. As highlighted in section
III, we identify the following channels: (1) an income/cash flow channel, which measures
the effect of interest rates on net interest payments; (2) a wealth channel to capture the
impact of interest rates on wealth; (3) a direct interest channel on consumption; (4) a cost
of capital channel to capture the effect of interest rates on investment and (5) an exchange
rate channel to capture the effects of changes in the exchange rate due to changes in
interest rates.
The results for GDP and prices are shown in Tables 6 and 7 and we have reported two sets
of results for the channel decomposition, the first with a ‘common monetary policy’ and
the second with a ‘channel-dependent monetary policy’.
27 This reflects the earlier
                                                  
27 Following standard practice (see for instance BIS (1995) or Van Els et al (2001)), the results reported in
Tables 6 & 7 refer to the contributions of each channel to the deviations in output and prices from their
baseline levels in that year. It should be noted that an alternative approach would have been to examine theECB • Working Paper No 93 • December 2001 34
discussion on the implications of the use of a monetary policy rule after the initial 2-year
hike on the channel decomposition. In the case of the ‘common monetary policy’ we
impose the identical path of interest rates and the exchange rate from the overall
simulation 4 on all channels. In the ‘channel dependent monetary policy’ case we have
allowed the monetary policy reaction from year 3 onwards to be different in each of the
simulations to identify the channels. Therefore, we allow the reaction of the Taylor Rule
to be endogenous for each channel so that channels which had the largest effects on output
and prices would induce a bigger monetary policy response than those channels where the
effects were more muted. This means that the path of interest rates from year 3 onwards is
different for each channel. Another feature of this channel dependent monetary policy
case is that we allow the exchange rate movement generated by the forward-looking UIP
condition to be endogenous to the exchange rate only channel. For each year the dominant
channel – i.e. the one with the largest impact – is shown in bold.
As shown in Table 6, in the case of the NiGEM model with the common monetary policy,
the clear message is that in the initial period the exchange rate channel is the most
important, accounting for 0.15% of the 0.24% fall in output in year one. Thereafter it
gradually diminishes in importance reflecting the fact that the real exchange rate rapidly
returns close to its baseline level. From year two onwards the domestic channels – and
most notably the cost of capital in investment channel – gradually gain in importance. The
direct interest effect in consumption has only a very modest impact reflecting the fact that
such an effect is only present in three countries of the euro area. Nevertheless, the effects
of the wealth channel are not that much larger, whilst the income channel assumes greater
importance from year 3.
In the case of the AWM, the cost of capital channel is also the most important domestic
channel in the first three years but unlike NiGEM it is more important than the exchange
rate channel for the whole of the reporting period. This reflects the fact that the elasticity
of the user cost of capital in investment is quite high in the AWM model. As indicated in
Fagan et al (2001) a 100 basis point rise in the real interest rate will lower investment by
around 10% after 10 years. The impacts of a 100 basis point rise in the user cost of capital
on investment in NiGEM vary between countries, but are generally well below 10% after
10 years.
                                                                                                                                           
contribution of each channel to the change in GDP or prices with respect to the baseline. From the second year
onwards, such an approach could potentially lead to a different assessment of the relative contribution and
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Table 6: Decomposition of Channels for the GDP Response





Cost of capital Exchange Rate
Channel
NiGEM
1 -0.24 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 -0.06 -0.15
2 -0.31 -0.05 -0.04 -0.03 -0.10 -0.07
3 -0.19 -0.06 -0.02 -0.03 -0.03 0.03
5 -0.09 -0.05 0.03 0.00 0.07 -0.02
AWM
1 -0.41 -0.05 0.00 -0.06 -0.21 -0.08
2 -0.86 -0.16 -0.01 -0.04 -0.57 -0.06
3 -0.83 -0.25 -0.02 0.06 -0.60 0.02
5 -0.61 -0.29 -0.06 0.05 -0.12 -0.06





Cost of capital Exchange Rate
Channel
NiGEM
1 -0.24 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.07 -0.19
2 -0.31 -0.03 -0.04 -0.02 -0.16 -0.13
3 -0.19 -0.05 -0.03 -0.02 -0.12 -0.01
5 -0.09 -0.05 -0.01 0.01 -0.04 -0.01
AWM
1 -0.41 0.03 0.00 -0.06 -0.21 -0.14
2 -0.86 0.05 -0.01 -0.04 -0.57 -0.17
3 -0.83 0.04 -0.02 0.03 -0.62 -0.11
5 -0.61 0.00 -0.08 0.02 -0.35 -0.05
One interesting contrast is the magnitude of the income effects in the two models as the
effects are much larger in the AWM. Both models take into account the effects of changes
in interest rates on government interest payments. This should have a broadly neutral
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induces a fiscal reaction as the government seeks to adjust taxes in response to the change
in interest costs. However, as already discussed, in the AWM the initial impact of the fall
in long-term interest rates induced under simulation 4 is strongly negative, which is a
somewhat counter-intuitive result. The reason is that the income loss is experienced
immediately whilst it takes time for the fiscal rule to react and reduce taxation to restore
the government budget balance to its baseline level. Nevertheless, the magnitude of this
negative income effect from falling long-rates appears large in the AWM and is much
larger than NiGEM would generate for a similar path of long-term interest rates. However,
in this case, the negative income effect in NiGEM is not from this source as long-term
interest rates do not fall in the NiGEM simulation. In NiGEM the negative income effect
principally stems from the fact that this model takes into account that the domestic interest
payments to foreigners increase following the rise in short-rates which leads to a
worsening in the current account and net wealth.
To some extent, the relative importance of the channels alters when the decomposition is
undertaken with a channel-dependent monetary policy. In NiGEM the exchange rate
channel remains dominant in year 1 to be superseded by the cost of capital channel in year
2. However the relative importance of the other channels declines, notably the income
effect which was previously dominant in year 3. A similar pattern also exists in the AWM
results but the change is more striking, with the important income effect discussed above
disappearing. This is because long-rates do not fall significantly with the channel
dependent monetary policy. Since the dominant channels are closed there is no significant
fall in output and hence no need for the Taylor Rule to lower short-term interest rates.
In terms of the impact on prices, the exchange rate channel tends to dominate initially with
both models, as the change in exchange rate has a direct and rapid impact on import
prices. Thereafter the exchange rate channel remains dominant for the NiGEM results,
reflecting the fact that there is a permanent nominal appreciation, accompanied by a
permanent fall in prices whilst most variables which have the potential to impact on prices
have returned to their baseline levels. In the case of the AWM the cost of capital channel
takes over in the case of the AWM in year 2, reflecting the larger and more persistent
output gap that emerges in this case.ECB • Working Paper No 93 • December 2001  37
Table 7: Decomposition of Channels for the Response of Prices





Cost of capital Exchange Rate
Channel
NiGEM
1 -0.05 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 -0.08
2 -0.08 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.03 -0.12
3 -0.15 -0.02 -0.03 -0.02 -0.02 -0.12
5 -0.31 -0.05 -0.03 -0.03 -0.08 -0.13
AWM
1 -0.10 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 -0.02 -0.07
2 -0.24 -0.03 0.00 -0.02 -0.12 -0.07
3 -0.39 -0.09 0.00 -0.02 -0.26 -0.01
5 -1.02 -0.30 -0.03 0.01 -0.55 -0.11





Cost of capital Exchange Rate
Channel
NiGEM
1 -0.05 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.04 -0.11
2 -0.08 0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.06 -0.18
3 -0.15 0.00 -0.02 -0.02 0.02 -0.21
5 -0.31 -0.03 -0.04 -0.03 -0.06 -0.25
AWM
1 -0.10 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.02 -0.12
2 -0.24 0.01 0.00 -0.02 -0.12 -0.17
3 -0.39 0.03 0.00 -0.02 -0.26 -0.14
5 -1.02 0.06 -0.03 -0.02 -0.61 -0.20ECB • Working Paper No 93 • December 2001 38
VI.  Conclusions
In this paper we have examined some of the issues faced by macroeconomic model
builders in analysing the monetary transmission mechanism using the AWM and NiGEM
models. Our results have highlighted the importance of various aspects of model and
simulation design in affecting the results from such monetary policy exercises. From this
exercise we draw the following conclusions:
•  The NiGEM and AWM models yield broadly similar results for the effect of monetary
policy on output for the first 2-3 years when the forward-looking elements of the
model are not used. Both the maximum and the cumulative loss of output over the
first three years are quite similar, but there are differences in the timing of the output
loss. This holds true when monetary and fiscal policy rules are introduced into the
simulations.
•  Allowing forward-looking behaviour in the models tends to increase the initial impact
of the monetary policy exercise but also hastens the return to baseline values. Once
the forward-looking elements of the model are allowed to operate the impact in the
AWM is clearly stronger than in the NiGEM model. The output losses in the AWM
are approximately twice as large in each of the first three years. A major factor behind
this is the particularly large adverse income effects stemming from the fall in long-
term interest rates generated by the forward-looking simulation.
•  The models also have quite different properties in the longer term and after 5 years
there has been a clear divergence in the results. This reflects a faster adjustment speed
in the NiGEM model, which has largely returned to its baseline values by year 5. The
considerably faster reaction of the NiGEM model reflects relatively stronger
feedbacks and error correction mechanisms leading to a faster speed of adjustment
and the larger number of forward-looking elements within the NiGEM model.
•  The paper has highlighted the effects of using monetary policy rules following the
initial interest rate shock. From the third year, a Taylor Rule will tend to lower interest
rates in an attempt to return output and prices towards their baseline values. The initial
response of the Taylor Rule was broadly similar across both models, although given
the slower adjustment in the AWM, interest rates need to remain below their baseline
levels for longer. The initial impact of the Taylor Rule on output and prices is not that
large, but it does serve to expedite the return to baseline values. One important
consequence of using such rules is that a decision has to be taken on how to treat them
in the channel decomposition.
•  If a fiscal policy rule is used – which seeks to maintain a target level of the
government deficit or debt stock – this will tend to exacerbate the initial fall in outputECB • Working Paper No 93 • December 2001  39
due to the monetary policy shock. The initial impact of the fiscal rule is not that large
as it acts with some delay, but it does increase in importance in the second and third
years of the simulations
•  In both models, the user cost of capital tends to be the dominant channel of
transmission in terms of its impact on GDP when a common monetary policy is
implemented across all channels. The main exceptions are that in the first year in the
NiGEM model, the exchange rate channel is dominant whilst the income channel
grows in importance in later years in both models. The user cost of capital and income
effects tend to be larger in the AWM than in the NiGEM model. In the former case
this is due to a higher sensitivity in the AWM to changes in the user cost of capital. In
the latter case it is due to a particularly marked income effect from the impact of
changes in long-term interest rates on government interest payments. The general
pattern of results is not significantly altered when using a channel-specific monetary
policy, although the income channel significantly diminishes in importance in the
AWM. In terms of the impact on prices, the exchange rate channel plays an important
role in both models given the direct impact on import prices stemming from changes
in the exchange rate.ECB • Working Paper No 93 • December 2001 40
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Appendix 1 : Maquette Notation
P: Inflation Rate
B: Stock OF Government Debt
C : Real Consumption
CA: Current Account
DEFICIT: Government Deficit Level
ER : Nominal Exchange Rate
G: Government Expenditure






MPK: Marginal Product Of Capital
MPL: Marginal Product Of Labour
NFA: Stock Of Net Foreign Assets
P: Output Price
PK: Investment Deflator
PROD: Labour Productivity =(Y/L)
PY: Value-Added Deflator
R : Nominal Short Interest Rate
RL : Nominal Long Interest Rate
RLR : Real Long Interest Rate
TX: Tax Rate
UCOC: Nominal User Cost Of Capital
Wages: Wage Level
X: Export Volumes
Y : Real Income
i i i i i n j z a c f e b m z , , , , , , , , , : Coefficients
d : Depreciation rate.
D: First difference.ECB • Working Paper No 93 • December 2001  43
Appendix 2: Model Descriptions
AWM
The AWM is a single country model of the euro area. Its structure is fairly standard
having a long-run classical equilibrium with a vertical Phillips curve with some short-run
Keynesian features in price/wage setting and factor demands. As a result, activity is
determined in the short run by demand, given incomplete prices and wages adjustment. In
the longer run, output is supply determined, employment having converged to a level
consistent with the exogenously given level of equilibrium unemployment. In addition,
stock-flow adjustments are accounted for, e.g. by the inclusion of a wealth / cumulated
saving term in consumption. At present the treatment of expectations in the model is
limited; with the exception of the exchange rate (modelled by UIP) the model embodies
backward looking expectations – although in this paper we have incorporated a forward-
looking term structure. The model can in fact be adapted in a straightforward manner to
incorporate forward-looking expectations in other key equations. Full model listing and
simulation evidence can be found in Fagan et al (2001).
NiGEM
NiGEM is a 2500 equation quarterly global macro economic model with a specific focus
on major industrial countries. It has been used in comparative exercises organised by the
Macro Modelling Bureau at Warwick University, the OECD, the US Federal Reserve and
the Brookings Institute in Washington and in the EC financed SPES model. It has also
been widely used in academic studies of international policy co-operation as well as in
published forecasts and policy analyses, notably those published in the National Institute
Economic Review.
The model comprises the 18 detailed country sectors for the US, Canada, Japan, the EU
economies and Mexico (full details are given in NIESR (2001). Each of these contains up
to 110 variables covering individual components of demand, price indices, exchange rates
and interest rates, trade, the public sector and the current account.  Smaller models exist
for Norway, Switzerland, the Visigrad countries, South Korea and Australia/New Zealand.
The remaining sectors cover OPEC, East Asia, Latin America, Africa, China, developing
Europe and miscellaneous developing countries.
Behavioural equations in NiGEM are estimated not calibrated. The model incorporates
rational expectations in financial, foreign exchange and labour markets, and a largeECB • Working Paper No 93 • December 2001 44
number of options are available for setting fiscal policy and interest rates. The model is
essentially New Keynesian in its approach. Agents are assumed to be forward looking, but
nominal rigidities slow the adjustment to external events. Various mechanisms are in
place in the model to ensure that world trade adds up.ECB • Working Paper No 93 • December 2001  45
Appendix 3: Comparison with the WGEM Experiment
For comparative purposes we also compare the results of the four simulations reported in
this paper with another set of results. These have been generated using the AWM and
NiGEM models but following the specification of a monetary policy experiment
undertaken by the Working Group of Econometric Modelling (WGEM) using national
central banks models and the AWM. This work is reported in Van Els et al (2001).
The details of the experiment are as follows. Following BIS (1995), the monetary policy
shock was a two-year increase of the short-term policy interest rates by 1 percentage point
from 2001Q1-2002Q4. From and including 2003Q1 a return to baseline values was
assumed. No monetary or fiscal policy rules were implemented. The term structure was
modelled using the expectations hypothesis, while exchange rates were determined by a
simple uncovered interest parity condition. In both cases, risk premia were held constant
at baseline values and there was no change in inflation expectations. This resulted in an
appreciation of the euro nominal exchange rate of 1.63% in the first year and 0.62% in the
second, and a rise in long-term interest rates of 16 basis points in the first year and 6 basis
points in the second. Thereafter both the exchange rate and the long-term interest rates
were exogenised at their baseline value. The motivation for the design of the experiment is
outlined in Van Els et al (2001).
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The impact of this experiment on GDP using the AWM is given in Figure 4a with the line
marked ‘WGEM’. The closest comparison is with simulation 4, where there is also an
initial appreciation and forward-looking long rate condition. The initial impact of the
WGEM experiment is somewhat smaller than under simulation 4 but the subsequent
return to baseline is markedly more protracted. Whilst the initial appreciation is larger in
the WGEM case (1.6% as against 0.88%), which should lead to a larger initial loss in
output, this is more than offset by the differing path of long term interest rates. In the
WGEM scenario long-rate rise slightly above base whilst in simulation 4 they fall well
below base reflecting the future decline in short-term interest rates when the Taylor Rule
operates. As has already been discussed a fall in long-term interest rates has a significant
negative effect on output as lower government income payments cut personal income.
Without the fall long-term interest rates the WGEM experiment generates much reduced
negative income effects.
















The subsequent return towards the baseline is much more protracted in the case of the
WGEM scenario. This reflects the fact that the Taylor Rule is acting to reduce short-term
interest rates and thereby aiming to close the output gap and return inflation to its baseline
level. Figure 4b compares the deviation of inflation from its baseline level. The fall of
inflation below baseline is initially stronger in the WGEM experiment - reflecting theECB • Working Paper No 93 • December 2001  47
sharper appreciation in the exchange rate. However, by year 3, the exchange rate is back
to baseline in the WGEM experiment and the larger output loss in simulation 4 means that
the fall in inflation is larger in magnitude. This remains the case for a number of years but
subsequently the fall in inflation becomes broadly similar in both simulations.
Figures 5a and 5b compare the same simulations using the NiGEM model (using the same
scale as for the AWM figures to ensure comparability). In the NiGEM case the initial
impact of the larger appreciation is a larger fall in output than in simulation 4 as the
compensating long-rates income effect generated by the AWM in simulation 4 was not
relevant for simulation 4 in NiGEM. Thereafter the absence of a monetary policy rule in
the WGEM simulation means that it does not stabilise back at the baseline as quickly as in
simulation 4.















































The impact on inflation in the NiGEM model is much less pronounced than in the AWM
case as shown in Figure 5b. Nevertheless, inflation falls further below baseline in the
WGEM experiment than in simulation 4, reflecting the larger output gap that emerges in
this simulation. The WGEM simulation also requires a period of above baseline inflation
to return the price level to its baseline level as the nominal exchange rate is also fixed at
its baseline values. This is not required in simulation 4 where there is a permanent
nominal appreciation and a permanent fall in prices and hence no need for a period of
above baseline inflation.ECB • Working Paper No 93 • December 2001 48
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